



Cleaning up bad bundler behavior

Open industry informative calls
8 March 2018

In this deck, we use the term “bundlers” to generically refer to bundlers, download managers, and inline offers

Note: This deck and its examples were prepared to help guide and encourage bundlers/interested parties into making appropriate changes to meet AppEsteem’s Deceptor-level requirements so consumers are better protected. The deck isn’t meant to be comprehensive; it’s a starting point for more discussions. The examples were taken from apps we found available online, and are provided for informative purposes. They were current when we captured them, but as most vendors update their apps, they may not reflect consumer experiences in the apps’ most current versions.

What's in this deck?

- We want to clean up bad bundler behavior so consumers are better protected
- We want to allow bundlers that do it right to have a level playing field
- We've worked with our security partners to fine-tune these behaviors
- We're adding bad bundlers to our Deceptor lists/feeds starting in April
- This deck should help you understand the requirements and our plans

From our blog... a handy summary of the behavior we're targeting

- Download managers who don't make it clear to you that they're not the app you were trying to get, but a wrapper that's going to offer you additional apps.
- Offers that don't make it clear to you that they're offers, or try to make you think that they're part of app you wanted, or act like they're specifically recommended.
- Unclear and inconsistent ways for you to accept, skip, or decline offers and each component in the offers.
- Bundlers and download managers that don't stop when you ask them to, leave remnants on your desktop, or don't uninstall their offers when you cancel installing the app you wanted.
- Bundlers that ignore you when you say "no".

Six major changes affecting bundlers

ACRs promoted to Deceptor-level

****** (ACR-039) Everything installed per app, especially other apps, offers, and download managers, has clear indications of the relationship to the app.

****** (ACR-059) Clearly marked as optional and an offer, and only claims to be recommended when the recommender is clearly disclosed.

****** (ACR-055) Accept, cancel, skip, and decline options are obvious and/or explained to the consumer, and consistent across the install and offer experiences.

****** (ACR-053) If more than two offers will be made before, during, or after install, all but the final offer has a "skip offers" option.

ACR removed or changed

[removed]

(ACR-073) If offered app is unrelated or does not enhance the carrier app, acceptance requires a user action beyond a single-click "default" consumer action.


[removed certified requirement]

(ACR-106) Neither the offers nor the carrier are Deceptor apps

Allow opt-out and nonCertified when done right


Goal: directly punish tricky behavior

ACR-039 violations




Designed to look like a EULA of the carrier

Not clear that the installer isn't really Skype's installer




Download manager misleads with the carrier logo




**** (ACR-039)** Everything installed per app, especially other apps, offers, and download managers, has clear indications of the relationship to the app. *Consumers must be able to understand the relationship within the files and with other apps. This should be accomplished in EULAs, readme files, how the files and directories are named, and installation location*

If you install other separate apps, disclose that you're doing this, and name/install them in a way that's easy for the consumer to recognize that they came with your app. If the consumer wanted a carrier and you are launching a third-party download manager, disclose this up front and make it clear during the install and in the filename that this is the case. If your install has other offers, make sure the offers stand out as separate from your carrier so consumers can clearly see this distinction.
Applies to: Install

ACR-059 violations



No recommendation attribution




Not marked as an offer

**** (ACR-059)** Clearly marked as an offer, clearly implies it is optional, and only claims to be recommended when the recommender is explicitly disclosed.
Offers need to be recognizable as offers. Recommendations must be claimed by whoever is making them.

Mark all offers as optional, and make it clear they are optional and not required. If you say the offer is recommended, you must truthfully show who is making the recommendation: the installer/bundler, or the carrier.
Applies to: Landing page, Inline offers, In-bundle offers, Bundler-made offers, Internal offers


ACR-055 violations



OK with next/back, but no obvious way to decline

**** (ACR-055)** Accept, cancel, skip, and decline options are obvious and/or explained to the consumer, and consistent across the install and offer experiences.


No attempting to mislead, shortcut, or even "guilt" the consumer. For instance, don't say "No, I don't want friends" on the decline button. Also, bundlers can't have the buttons work differently for different offers.




Not obvious/explained, and ties acceptance to friendship

Make your offer and install choices simple, clear, not tricky, and consistent across all offers being made.
Applies to: Install, Landing page, Inline offers, In-bundle offers, Bundler-made offers, Internal offers

Examples of non-violating screens



Says offer, no recommendation issues, clear accept/decline



Clumsy attribution and no EULA, but it's clear it's a download manager and has some attribution.

Don't forget existing Deceptor-level ACRs


Existing Deceptor-level ACRs that might apply

**(ACR-071) Each offer must be able to be accepted or declined independently.

**(ACR-050) User consent dialogs and features settings from the browser, search, or operating system, and existing security/safety apps, are not circumvented or blocked.

**(ACR-042) No other apps or unrelated components are installed before obtaining the consumer's permission through explicit user action.

ACR-071 violations




The single choice checkbox for just one of many components is misleading


**** (ACR-071)** Each offer must be able to be accepted or declined independently.
The intent is that consumers aren't forced to accept bundles of offers and "free bonuses" in the shopping cart.

Never apply a single acceptance to multiple offers. If you add a free bonus into the shopping cart, it must be able to be declined.
Applies to: Landing page, Inline offers, In-bundle offers, Bundler-made offers, Internal offers

ACR-050 violations



(1) Apps requests UAC...



(2) Yet continues when user chooses no

**** (ACR-050)** User consent dialogs and features settings from the browser, search, or operating system, and existing security/safety apps, are not circumvented or blocked.


The platforms and browsers and security/safety products must be able to do their protection unimpeded

Don't bypass any system, search, or browser protections. You can decorate or handhold to help prompt the consumer, but you cannot answer on their behalf.

Applies to: Install, Software

ACR-042 violations

App installs a
“continue
installation” icon
when user
cancels



**** (ACR-042)** No other apps or unrelated components are installed before obtaining the consumer's permission through explicit user action.

Installs must only come after consumer-accepted offers.

Do not install unrelated components or apps if you haven't gotten explicit permission (more than opt-out) from the consumer to do so.

Applies to: Install

Two more changes specifically for inline offers

ACRs newly promoted to Deceptor-level


****** (ACR-155) Interstitial is not inserted into an existing committed user workflow.

****** (ACR-030) Consumer can navigate away from interstitials (and interstitial will close), including at a minimum by using the back button, the address bar, clicking outside, and a close button.

Inline offer violations

This should be a clear accept or decline, and not linked back to the original "download". Violates ACR-155

No close button; clicking outside of interstitial does not dismiss. Violates ACR-030



**(ACR-155) Interstitial is not inserted into an existing committed user workflow.

Intent: no tricking the consumer into thinking this is the normal flow once the consumer commits to download/purchase/accept. For instance: an interstitial offer on another app's landing page must not look like it's part of the other app's download or install flow, and an interstitial ad should not look like it's part of a consumer purchase

Don't link your interstitial to the workflow. The interstitial must make it clear that it's separate from what the consumer was attempting to do, and not part of that flow. Applies to: Inline offers, Injected interstitials

**(ACR-030) Consumer can navigate away from interstitials (and interstitial will close), including at a minimum by using the back button, the address bar, clicking outside, and a close button. The intent is to not force the consumer to choose before proceeding

Don't make the consumer hunt for ways to close your injected interstitial. If the consumer clicks outside, dismiss your interstitial. Applies to: Inline offers, Injected interstitials


AppEsteem's services for Bundlers

Free Deceptor Notification

30 day notice

Covers install flow violations


Does not cover Deceptor offer and carrier apps



Free Bundler Certification

Certify the install flow and how offers are made

Require no carrier apps, no offered apps can be Deceptors



Premium Service for Bundlers

Faster review of flow, offer and carrier apps

Free consulting, App Jail Services, AppEsteem Insiders

Recommended by AppEsteem

Bundler Campaign Implementation

- Checklist: <https://customer.appesteem.com/Home/Checklist>
- Blog: <http://blog.appesteem.com/post/2018/02/27/why-clean-up-the-bundlers>
- Press release: <http://www.prweb.com/releases/2018/03/prweb15266051.htm>
- Request industry notification through CSA, Compliance Partners, and AppEsteem Insiders
- Direct emails to PPI networks
- Industry call: 8 March 2018
- Goal: call out the Bundlers/Downloaders as Deceptors
 - not the carriers/offers inside: we will focus on the bundler behavior
 - Date to first call out Deceptors: tests now until April; target early April.